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Comments
AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADINGS AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN
If it were possible, for purposes of expediency, it -would be fitting to at-
tempt to determine just what constitutes a "cause of action" for present pur-
poses. What is meant by this term in the various ramifications of its appli-
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been varied attempts to define "cause of action,"' none of which have been par-
ticularly successful when an attempt is made to apply the definition to the
different situations arising. The reason for this apparent failure at definition
is that the concept differs with the several problems that might arise in this
connection. A different degree of liberality is seemingly employed in testing
the sufficiency of the statement under a demurrer, than in determining the pos-
sibility of joinder of causes, the propriety of a counterclaim, the right to a more
specific statement, and the right to amend after the running of the Statutes of
Limitations. In this latter situation, the problem is to determine whether or
not the litigation presented by the amendment was commenced before the statute
has barred the plaintiff's right to recover.
The problem of when such amendment relates back to the commencement
of the action so that the bar of the statute will not attach, is one upon which
the general rules are well established in the decisions. Where an amendment
of the declaration, petition or complaint states no new claim or cause of ac-
tion, and makes no new demand, it relates back to the commencement of the
action, and the running of the Statute of Limitations against said cause of ac-
tion or claim, is tolled at that point.2 But where the amendment sets up a
new cause, claim, or makes a new demand, it does not relate back and the stat-
ute continues to run until the filing of the amended complaint.0 The applica-
tion of these general principles presents great difficulty as is shown by the in-
harmonious decisions of the courts. At least a part of this lack of harmony
in the decisions is caused by the variance in the provisions of the statutes of
the different states. To enunciate the rules applicable is a simple matter, but
1. BLIss, CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1887) § 117; CLARK, CODE) PLEADING(1928) § 19; PHILIPS, CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1932) § 187; POMEROY, CODs
REMEDiEs (5th ed. 1929) § 347.
2. Fidelity Title and Trust Co. v. Dubois Elec. Co., 253 U. S. 212 (1922);
Haynes v. Phillips, 211 Ala. 37, 99 So. 356 (1924); Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill.
380, 71 N. E. 350 (1904); Emeny v. Farmers' Elevator Co., 194 Iowa 282, 189
N. W. 720 (1922); Lilly v. Tobein, 103 Mo. 477, 15 S. W. 618 (1890); Bricken
v. Cross, 163 Mo. 449, 64 S. W. 99 (1901); Gail v. Philadelphia, 273 Pa. 275,
117 Atl. 69 (1922); Love v. Southern Ry., 108 Tenn. 104, 65 S. W. 475 (1901).
In Buel v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 45 Mo. 562 (1870), the law was thus stated:
"Where the amendment sets up no new matter or claim, but is a mere variation
of the allegations affecting a demand already in issue, then the amendment relates
to the commencement of the suit, and the running of the statute is arrested at
that point; but where the amendment introduces a new claim, not before as-
serted, then it is not treated as relating to the commencement of the sut, but
as equivalent to a fresh suit upon a new cause of action-the running of the
statute continuing down to the time the amendment is filed." See 17 R. C. L.
815.
3. Union Pacific R. R. v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285 (1895); Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 297 Ill. 444, 130 N. E. 736 (1921): Matthvs v. Donelson,
179 Iowa, 1111, 160 N. W. 944 (1917); Goldberg v. Friedrich, 279 Pa. 572. 124
Atl. 186 (1924); Irvine v. Barrett, 119 Va. 587, 89 S. E. 904 (1916). See 2
WOOD, LIMITATIONS OF AcTIoNS (4th ed. 1916) 1526, stating the usual theory
that where an amended complaint sets up a new cause of action, the Statute of
Limitations continues to run until the amendment is filed.
[Vol. 4
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when an attempt is made to apply them to the various factual situations aris-
ing, a different and more perplexing problem arises.
In a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court,4 it was held
that an amendment in a personal injury action broadening the description of
the place where the injury occurred to include another building more than five
hundred feet away, did not state a new cause of action and hence was not bar-
red by the running of the Statute of Limitations. The court speaking through
Mr. Justice Black, said: "Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of ar-
riving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They
should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end."
This decision illustrates the tendency in many recent decisions toward a
liberal view point. It seems that such a situation is indeed the proper place
for liberality, because the importance of the pleadings ought to lie solely in
their effectiveness as a means to reach a just result. Thus it seems that a too
technical approach could do nothing other than obstruct justice.
Many tests have been used in a futile attempt to pigeon-hole a solution
to the problem of identity of causes of action in the original and amended plead-
ings. A few of those most frequently applied are: Will the new allegations
deprive the other party of some substantive defense which he had to the other
pleading? 5 Is the measure of damages the same in each case?8 Will the same
evidence support both the original and amended pleadings?7 Would a judg-
ment upon the original pleading bar an action on the amendment, or vice versa?s
Although all of these tests have been applied by the courts, it would be
better to determine the question on each factual situation as it arises, rather
than on the legal theory of the action. The question for determination in each
instance should be, whether or not the pleading still seeks redress on account
of the same transaction, or sets out substantially the same defense, as the
original pleading did.
Very frequently the question is presented as to whether an amendment
which supplies an essential allegation to the pleading states a new cause of
action so as to be barred by the Statute of Limitations. Where there is merely
a defective statement, it seems well established that the amended pleading will
relate back to the time of filing the original and will be unaffected by the
statute.9 But where no cause of action is stated in the pleading, through a de-
4. Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 58 Sup. Ct. 507 (1938).
5. Card v. Stower's Pork Packing & Provision Co., 253 Pa. 575, 98 Atl. 728
(1916); Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456, 61 S. W. 707
(1901).
6. Hurst v. Detroit City Ry., 84 Mich. 539, 48 N. W. 44 (1891).
7. Carlin v. Chicago, 262 Ill. 564, 104 N. E. 905 (1914).
8. Burkhart v. Millikan, 76 Ind. App. 480, 130 N. E. 837 (1921); Van
Patten v. Waugh, 122 Iowa 302, 98 N. W. 119 (1904). For a complete state-
ment of these tests, see Whalen v. Gordon, 95 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899);
also Wisconsin Chair Co. v. I. G. Ely Co., 91 S. W. (2d) 913 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936).
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fect of substance, there is a division in the cases as to the effect of an amend-
ment. One line of authority says that if there is an omission of an essential
allegation, the pleading fails to state a cause of action and the statute is not
arrested by the filing of such.10 This view seems to be entirely too technical
and the courts that follow it seem to lose sight of the fundamental purpose of
pleadings, that of notice giving. Up until recent times this doctrine was rigid-
ly applied in Illinois," but with the passing of the Civil Practice Act in that
state, it was obviously the intention of the legislature to be less technical, and
the courts have so construed the act.' 2 There is a substantial body of authority
that has followed the more liberal approach and has held that, where an a-
mendment supplies an essential allegation to the original pleading, it relates
back to the filing of the original pleading and is unaffected by the expiration
of the period of limitations before the amendment.'
3
While it is impossible to anticipate all the possible changes that might be
made in an amended pleading, in order to get a better understanding of the
approach of the courts it is helpful to examine the rulings on some of the more
common amendments. When there is an amendment of a petition, declaration,
or complaint, changing the capacity in which the plaintiff is prosecuting the ac-
tion, it is generally held that such an amendment does not change the cause of
action so as to let in the defense of the Statute of Limitations.14 The reason-
ing back of these decisions seems to be that while the amendment causes the ac-
tion to be brought in form by another person, yet actually it is the same indi-
vidual in whose name the original pleading was filed. Missouri seems to be in
accord with this view.' 5 However, there are a few jurisdictions which use the
Eastern R. R. v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 14 Ariz. 209,
127 Pac. 713 (1912); Lichtenstein v. Fish Furniture Co., 272 Ill. 191, 111 N. E.
729 (1916).
10. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Chicago, 297 Ill. 444, 130 N. E. '736
(1921); Burke v. Unger, 88 Okla. 226, 212 Pac. 993 (1923); Bender v. Penfield,
235 Pa. 58, 83 Atl. 585 (1912). In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Bagley, 65 Kan.
188, 69 Pac. 189 (1902), the court held an amendment supplying the considera-
tion for the promise sued on, to be barred by the Statute of Limitations. Doster,
C. J., and Ellis, J., dissented saying that the defect in the original pleading was
merely formal and the majority was entirely too technical in its decision.
11. Walters v. City of Ottowa, 240 Ill. 259, 88 N. E. 651 (1909); Edmunds
v. City of Chicago, 203 Ill. App. 327 (1917).
12. Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 278 Ill. App. 350 (1935). See
note in (1935) 13 CHICAGO-KENT REv. 299.
13. Mohn v. Tingley, 191 Cal. 470, 217 Pac. 733 (1923); Tallapoosa v. Brock,
28 Ga. App. 384, 111 S. E. 88 (1922); Richard v. American Union Bank, 225
App. Div. 634, 234 N. Y. Supp. 177 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd in 253 N. Y. 166, 170
N. E. 532 (1930); Woodcock v. Bostic, 128 N. C. 243, 38 S. E. 881 (1901);
Salisbury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315 (1918) ; Bent v. Read, 82 W. Va.
680, 97 S. E. 286 (1918) ; Siever v. Klots Throwing Co., 101 W. Va. 457, 132 S. E.
882 (1926).
14. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570 (1913); Bryan v. Inspira-
tion Consol. Copper Co., 23 Ariz. 541, 205 Pac. 904 (1922); Herbert v. Byron
Jackson Iron Works, 39 Cal. App. 209, 178 Pac. 550 (1918); Bremer v. Chicago
& E. I. Ry., 247 fll. App. 406 (1927); Williams v. Mo. Valley Bridge & Iron
Co., 111 Kan. 34, 206 Pac. 327 (1922); Ghilain v. Couture, 146 Atl. 395 (N. H.
1929); Whitson v. Tennessee C. Ry., 40 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tenn. 1931).
15. In Drakopulos v. Biddle, 288 Mo. 424, 231 S. W. 924 (1921), it was held
[Vol. 4
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more technical approach.16 The theory of these courts is that there is really no
attempt to amend the pleading but rather to substitute a new action for the
one already pending.
At common law where the forms of action were strictly adhered to, and un-
der the earlier rules in code jurisdictions,17 it was generally held that where
there is a change of theory in the amendment, it may be barred by the period
of limitations. The view in the majority of modern decisions is that where
there is an amendment changing the theory upon which it is sought to hold a
defendant, it is proper unless it presents an entirely new cause of action.18
It is often difficult to draw the line between cases where the change in theory
does, or does not, amount to a different cause of action. Consequently some
cases, while distinguishable because of a slight difference in the factual situ-
ation, are clearly contrary to the aforementioned liberal view.1 9
When the amendment of the plaintiff's initial pleading changes allegations
as to the capacity in which the defendant is sued, we again find the general
statement that such amendment is proper if a new cause of action is not stated,
and again the chief difficulty lies in determining just when such new cause is
stated. Theoretically, when there is a change in legal capacity in which a de-,
fendant is sued, it seems there is a new cause of action, because a change in
capacity constitutes a change in persons in strict legal theory. Actually, it
is not true that there is a change in persons, and it should be held that there is
no new cause of action, because the cause of action is based on the invasion of
the same substantive right and by the same physical being. In an early Mis-
that no new cause of action was presented so as to let in the defense of limita-
tions where an action was brought by the administrator, founded on a statute
giving the personal representative a right of action, and amendment was made
substituting the widow and setting out that, under another statute, she was en-
titled to bring the action. See, also, Pyle v. University City, 279 S. W. 217 (Mo.
App. 1926), where an action for death was brought by the deceased's parents,
and amendment was made substituting the personal representative, who was
not appointed until after the running of the Statute of Limitations. In this
case this question was not necessary to the decision of the case, but the court
said: "However, if the point were here, we should be disposed to rule, under the
doctrine of liberal allowance of amendments, and amendments which expressly
save a cause of action from the statute of limitations, that this amendment could
be made."
16. La Bar v. New York, S. & W. R. R., 218 Pa. 261, 67 Atl. 413 (1907);
Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 Atl. 346 (1931). In Bennett v. North
Carolina R. R., 159 N. C. 345, 74 S. E. 883 (1912), the court said: "While courts
are liberal in permitting amendments, such as are germane to a cause of action,
it has been frequently held that the court has no power to convert a pending ac-
tion that cannot be maintained into a new and different action by the process
of amendment." (citing cases.)
17. See CLARK, CODFI PLEADING (1928) 515, setting out various instances
where changes in theory were and were not permitted.
18. Clinchfield R. R. v. Dunn, 40 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ; Skala v.
Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N. E. 832 (1931); Scott v. Schisler, 153 Atl. 395 (N. J.
1931).
19. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Bentel, 166 Cal. 473, 137 Pae. 25 (1913); Henger
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souri case20 it was held that an amendment in a suit against the estate of a
deceased maker of a promissory note to recover upon such note, which only
changes the characterization of the defendant from administratrix to execu-
trix, does not introduce a new cause of action so as to let in the defense of
limitations. While this case does not come within the group of borderline de-
cisions, its theory should be extended to those cases. 21
In cases where the amendment of the pleadings after the period of limita-
tions consists of substituting a new defendant, it appears reasonably clear
that the action would be barred against the new defendant because it states an
entirely new cause of action against him.22 This should not, however, be taken
as an arbitrary rule, and if the substitution only constitutes a formal change,
and the notice given by the amended pleading is for all practical purposes the
same, then the amendment should be permitted. 2 The cases are not entirely
in harmony, due to *differences in the opinion of the courts as to when a new
cause of action is stated.24
It is well settled that, where the only change made by the amendment is
in the prayer for relief or in the remedy sought, the running of the statute be-
fore the amendment is filed will not be a bar to the action, because there is a
mere continuance of the original action with a claim for a different remedy.
The uniform holding of the courts is that the prayer is no part of the cause
of action but is merely the pleader's idea of the relief to which he is entitled.20
The courts have consistently attempted to apply the cause of action test,
in determining whether an amendment is barred by the statute, and, as a re-
sult, we find the decisions so conflicting it is impossible to tell just how a court
will decide a particular case. Whatever decision is reached can be supported
by a substantial number of cases, and, on the other hand, criticized as being in
20. Gewe v. Hanszen, 85 Mo. App. 136 (1900).
21. Evans v. Richardson, 76 Ala. 329 (1884); Boyd v. U. S. Mortg. & T.
Co., 187 N. Y. 262, 79 N. E. 999 (1907); Kopperl v. Sterling, 241 S. W. 553
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922). But see Bender v. Penfield, 235 Pa. 58, 83 Atl. 585
(1912); Stine v. Herr, 78 Pa. Super. 226 (1922).
22. Jaicks v. Sullivan, 128 Mo. 177, 30 S. W. 890 (1895); Smith v. Barrett,
41 Mo. App. 460 (1890); St. Joseph ex rel. Forsee v. Baker, 86 Mo. App. 310
(1900); Wigton v. Smith, 57 Neb. 299, 77 N. W. 772 (1899); Mitchell v. Hines,
101 Okla. 38, 223 Pac. 182 (1924); Girardi v. Laquin Lbr. Co., 232 Pa. 1, 81
Atl. 63 (1911); McGee v. Ferguson Seed Farms, 34 S. W. (2d) 338 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931).
23. Manistee Mill Co. v. Hobdy, 165 Ala. 411, 51 So. 871 (1909); Moody v.
Wickersham, 111 Kan. 770, 207 Pac. 847 (1922); Johnson v. Carroll, 172 N. E.
85 (Mass. 1930) ; Texas and P. Ry. v. Comstock, 83 Tex. 537, 18 S. W. 946 (1892);
Ft. Worth and R. G. Ry. v. Sellers, 242 S. W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
24. See cases in notes 22 and 23, supra.
25. Friederichsen v. Renart, 247 U. S. 207 (1918), a case arising in Nebraska
where two Nebraska cases are cited as illustraive of the rule: McKeighan v.
Hopkins, 19 Neb. 33, 26 N. W. 614 (1886), and Butler v. Smith, 84 Neb. 78, 120
N. W. 1106 (1909); Case v. Blood, 71 Iowa 632, 33 N. W. 144 (1887); Eagan v.
Murray, 102 Kan. 193, 170 Pac. 389 (1918); Finzer v. Peters, 232 N. W. 762
(Neb. 1930); Woodcock v. Bostic, 128 N. C. 243, 38 S. E. 881 (1901); Truman
v. Lester, 71 App. Div. 612, 75 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1st Dep't 1902) ; see 21 R. C. L.
586; R. C. L. PERm. SupP. 5078.
[Vol. 4
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1939], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss1/5
COMMENTS
conflict with a goodly array of authority. It seems that the courts which fol-
low this technical viewpoint have become so absorbed in theory that they have
lost sight of the real object of the pleadings. The logical method to avoid
having these conflicting decisions would be to abandon the cause of action test
entirely, and consider whether the notice given by the original and amended
pleadings is substantially the same. Is the notice given by the original plead-
ing fair notice to the opposing party of what is contained in the amendment?
This is what has, in effect, been done by the liberal courts which purport to
apply the cause of action test. The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure28 pro-
vide: Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading." Since this provision does not mention "cause of action,"
the federal courts are free to adopt the more practical test of notice-giving.
DAvtD R. HARDY
CONTRACTING AGAINST LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
When considering a contract by which one party agrees to free the other
from any liability for damages which the former may suffer due to the negli-
gent act of the latter, certain considerations of social policy play a very large
and important part in determining its validity. There is the social interest in
the utmost freedom to contract, and in the security of transactions when en-
tered into, to be weighed against the social effect of such a contract.
A contract that is not freely and voluntarily entered into and which works
a hardship on one party should be invalid. It becomes necessary, therefore,
to look into the circumstances under which the contract was made to determine
if the parties did freely and voluntarily enter into the agreement. One of the
principal aids in so determining is to look at the comparative positions of the
parties. Illustrative are the situations where it is necessary for the one party
to enter into the contract to obtain something that is vital to him or to his fami-
ly, a form of economic duress, or where the superior knowledge of facts (not
amounting to fraud) gives the one in the superior position the power to insert
any provisions which are favorable to him, which the other must accept regard-
less of his realization of possible detrimental effects. There is strong reason to
distinguish between contracts relieving a person from the consequences of his
own negligent act when made under these circumstances, and contracts made
by two persons in equal positions, entered into without coercion of any kind, in
which the one party for a good consideration voluntarily assumes the risk of
any injury. In this case the social interests in freedom of contract and in the
security of transactions are dominant.
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There is an additional situation, closely related to the one where the par-
ties contracting are not in equal positions, where the courts have a cogent rea-
son for placing limitations against contracting away responsibility for negli-
gence out of fear that the public welfare will be detrimentally affected. That
case is where one of the parties is charged with a duty of public service, and
the bargain relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty
to the public, for which it has received or been promised compensation.1 Due
to the social interest in the general welfare, it was early held that, although
ordinary bailees may make their own terms with their customers, it is not so
with common carriers and inn-keepers. Arising from their public employ-
ment, public policy demands that they should not be discharged from their
duties and responsibilities, and that consequently they limit their common law
liability by express agreement.2 Courts constantly analyze the public servants'
contracts to determine if they are an attempt to contract away the consequences
of a breach of a legal duty or responsibility in such a manner as to be against
the public interests.3 The exemption contract is no bar, for the action which
is subsequently brought is based upon the common law responsibility of the
carrier (or possibly statutory responsibility) for negligence from which no
special contract can relieve him. The liability of the public servant does not
arise from a special contract, expressed or implied, but upon a neglect of pub-
lic duty.4
Another argument strongly advanced as a reason for declaring the type
of contract under discussion invalid is the possibility that the one who has re-
ceived the promise will become lax due to his position of security, thus enhanc-
ing the possibility of injuries.5 This argument is based on the theory that it is
the possibility of loss, usually pecuniary, which causes one to be more careful
with his dealings with fellow men. Where we have a contract that is freely
entered into, with none of the first two objections applicable, it seems then, if
the contract is to be invalidated because it contravenes social policy, it must be
1. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 575. For a thorough treatment of
these types of bailments, see ELLIOTT, BAILMENTS (2d ed. 1929) §§ 115, 180
et seq.; GODDARD, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (2d ed. 1928) §§ 186, 250 et seq.;
Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Negligence (1907)
20 HARv. L. REv. 297.
2. Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251 (N. Y. 1838).
3. Judge Lamm, of the Missouri Supreme Court, referring to the rule that
those owing a duty of public service cannot relieve themselves from the con-
sequences of their negligent act, says: "The reason underlying the rule is, that
while, ordinarily, the courts will enforce contracts made by persons who are sui
juris, still the public has an interest in contracts for carriage of passengers,
and the law will require them to be just and reasonable, even if the passenger
had not so required or had otherwise expressly agreed." Powell v. Union Pac.
R. R., 255 Mo. 420, 164 S. W. 628 (1914).
4. Clark v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry., 64 Mo. 440 (1877).
5. "Undoubtedly contracts exempting persons from liability for negligence
induce a want of care, for the highest incentive to the exercise of due care rests
in a consciousness that a failure in this respect will fix liability to make full
compensation for any injury resulting from the cause." 6 R. C. L. 727, citing
Southern Express Co. v. Owens, 146 Ala. 412, 41 So. 752 (1906).
[Vol. 4
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so done on the force of this last objection. As cases involving contracts of
the above type are recurring in the reports, it is well to examine the merits
of a theory which is the sole force by which contracts entered into by compe-
tent parties are to be rendered unenforceable. Following the reasoning, namely,
when one is relieved from the consequences of his negligent act, a want of due
care is thereby induced and thus the contract is invalid, it would seem to follow
that any agreement, by which one would be relieved from this possibility of
loss from his own negligent conduct, would likewise be invalid as a matter of
social policy. In either case the result would seem to be the same, namely, a
failure to use due care. But in the law we find many instances where the one
party has by contract freed himself entirely from the consequences of his neg-
ligent conduct. One would search long and fruitlessly to find any recent de-
cision holding an insurance policy, insuring a driver against any damage which
may result even from his own negligent driving, void for any reason.6 Some
states require drivers to insure before a license is issued.7 Yet is not "the
highest incentive to use due care," as advanced by those who would invalidate
these contracts, as fully destroyed here as in a contract between the two par-
ties effecting the same result?
In contracts providing for indemnification for any loss that one may suffer
by having to respond in damages for the result of his negligence, the same ob-
jection would appear to be present. But these contracts are not against pub-
lic policy. Where it was argued that, if a railroad company be reimbursed for
its negligent act in the maintenance of a crossing, it would have a tendency to
cause the company to omit the performance of the duties imposed by statute,
which required railroad companies to keep certain public crossings in proper
condition for the use of the traveling public, the reply of the court in disposing
of the contention was merely that "the contract does not undertake to relieve
the railroad company from the duties imposed by the article, nor free it from
liability for damages occasioned to others as the result of its failure to perform
those duties." The court said "we cannot assume that because the agreement
was made the railroad company will violate the statute."s Between the case
where one contracts for indemnification from a third person and where the
6. "Most automobile owners insure themselves against claims which may
be asserted against them even for their own negligence. . . . It plainly con-
travenes no public policy of this state." Gorman Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. R.
R., 213 Ky. 551, 281 S. W. 487 (1926). Because temptation to negligence may
probably result from the insurance policy, it cannot be said the policy necessarily
begets negligence, so as to be against public policy. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland v. Moore, 3 F. (2d) 652 (D. Ore. 1925), appeal dismissed, 272 U. S.
317 (1926).
7. Here there is a larger public good to be served, namely, an assurance
to the one injured that he may recover even if the driver is financially ir-
responsible. Also, there is still the danger of criminal liability facing the neg-
ligent driver.
8. Houston & Tex. Cent. R. R. v. Diamond Press Brick Co., 111 Tex. 18, 222
S. W. 204 (1920). Accord: Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co.,
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two parties themselves agree that the one is not to be liable for the consequences
of his negligent act, it seems that social policy would more readily invalidate
the contract of the first type. In both, the incentive to use due care is equally
destroyed and according to the reasoning, an individual is more likely to be in-
jured. In the former, the one injured is not necessarily, and not even likely
to be, the one who contracted to indemnify, while in the latter case the very
party to the contract is the one who is assuming the risk and the one who brought
on this laxness in the negligent person, if we are to assume that negligence is
the logical result of these contracts. In the one case the injured party himself
freely made the situation possible. In the other case, where a member of the
public is injured,, because of this laxness caused by this position of security
from pecuniary loss, created by a third party's contract to indemnify the negli-
gent person, the one injured had nothing to do with creating the situation.
In brief, the same reason for being negligent is present in both, while in the
contract for indemnification the one injured has no control over the cause. If
either has force for being against public policy, it would clearly seem to be the
latter. But contracts permitting indemnification for loss suffered even from
the negligent act of the indemnified party are generally not held to be against
public policy.9
The validity of contracts relieving one from liability for negligence cannot
be stated in comprehensive terms. The cases actually involving contracts re-
lieving the one party from the consequences of his negligent act can best be
understood by an individual treatment of the different capacities in which one
so .contracts.
The courts are agreed in holding that a person contracting in the capacity
of a common carrier cannot contract away his liability for negligence with the
person who is carried or whose goods is transported.1 A contract of this type
9. Payne v. National Transit Co., 300 Fed. 411 (W. D. Pa. 1921), aff'd,
National Transit Co. v. Davis, 6 F. (2d) '729 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925), cert. don. 269
U. S. 579 (1925). Here the transit company wanted to run pipes under the
tracks of the railroad company and agreed to indemnify the latter for any loss
suffered "in any manner or arising out of the laying of the pipes." The railroad
company had a train with a faulty spark arrester and a fire resulted. The rail-
road was permitted a recovery, and the contract was not against public policy.
Chesapeake Beach Ry. v. Hupp Automatic Exch. Co., 48 App. D. C. 123 (1918);
Gorman Coal Co. v. Louisville and N. R. R., 213 Ky. 551, 281 S. W. 487 (1926).
It was held here that a contract holding carrier harmless from claims for failure
to keep spur track clear was not against public policy, as relieving carrier from
common law liability for negligence. Bay State St. Ry. v. North Shore News
Co., 224 Mass. 323, 112 N. E. 1007 (1916); Kansas City, M. & B. R. R. v.
Southern Ry. News Co., 151 Mo. 373, 52 S. W. 205 (1899) (holding that a con-
tract entered into by a news company, wherein it agrees to indemnify a rail-
road company for and save it harmless from all damages it may have to pay
by reason of any injury to the news company's employees, whether caused by
the negligence of the railroad's employees or otherwise, does not violate any rule
of public policy) ; Cavanaugh v. Boland Co., Inc., 149 Misc. 576, 268 N. Y. Supp.
390 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
10. York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1865); Pierce v. So. Pac.
Co., 120 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. 874 (1898), 52 Pac. 302 (1868); Shellabarger Elevator
[Vol. 4
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is confronted with all the objections already considered. The common carrier
owes a duty to the public". arising from the public character of his employ-
ment and the extensive control he exercises over the property of others. The
obligation is imposed by law, and does not arise out of contract. Any breach
of this duty is a violation of the law which imposes the duty. Therefore, a con-
tract which exempts the carrier from damages resulting from negligence in the
discharge of these duties is void, because it relieves him of an absolute duty
which the law imposes upon it. 12 The objection that the parties are not in e-
qual position is also applicable. The traveler is often obliged to employ the
services of the carrier, and every time he must do so he cannot stop to settle the
terms and negotiate an agreement. The carrier, with its monopoly of transpor-
tation facilities, has the power to exact the contract that is most favorable to
it, and the traveler or shipper is faced with the dilemma of either refusing to
agree, with great inconvenience resulting, or of agreeing, thereby throwing the
risk of the negligence of persons employed by the carrier upon himself. 13 The
inequality in the situation of the parties would, if permitted, enable the com-
pany to obtain unfair contracts. 14
Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 278 Ill. 333, 116 N. E. 170 (1917); Ins. Co. v.
Lake Erie & W. R. R., 152 Ind. 333, 53 N. E. 382 (1899); Cox v. Cent. Vt. R. R.,
170 Mass. 129, 49 N. E. 97 (1898); Powell v. Union Pac. R. R., 255 Mo. 420,
164 S. W. 628 (1914); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Anderson, 120 Okla. 60, 250 Pac.
500 (1926); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Richmond, 94 Tex. 571, 63 S. W. 619 (1901).
4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) § 1109. Cf. Zimmer v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R.,
137 N. Y. 460, 33 N. W. 642 (1893). But now New York seems to follow the
majority view by virtue of a statute, as a matter of public policy in regard to
common carriage of goods (Murray v. Cunard S. S. Co., 235 N. Y. 162, 139 N. E.
226 (1923) dictum), but it still follows the minority view as to passengers.
11. York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1865).
12. Quirk Milling Co. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., 98 Minn. 22, 107
N. W. 742 (1906).
13. York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1865); Quirk Milling Co.
v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., 98 Minn. 22, 107 N. W. 742 (1906).
14. While the great majority of the courts agree that the common carrier
cannot by contract with the shipper or the traveler relieve himself from the
consequences of his negligent conduct, there are other contracts which he can
enter into and which the courts have not found to be against public policy. If
the passenger is carried gratuitously, some courts hold that a provision relieving
the carrier from liability is valid, on the theory that the carrier is not obliged
to transport such a person at all, and therefore may prescribe such terms as
he sees fit. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 (1904); Payne v.
Terre Haute & Ind. Ry., 157 Ind. 616, 62 N. E. 472 (1902); Quimby v. Boston
& Me. R. R., 150 Mass. 365, 23 N. E. 205 (1890); Ulrich v. N. Y. Cent. &
H. R. R. R., 108 N. Y. 80, 15 N. E. 60 (1888). Other courts reasoning that the
public is as greatly concerned in the safe transportation of one who rides
gratuitously as one who pays, refuse to allow the provision to bar a recovery.
Some cases so holding are: Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Hopkins, 41 Ala. 486 (1868);
Rose v. Des Moines Valley R. R., 39 Iowa 246 (1874); Pennsylvania R. R. v.
Butler, 57 Pa. 335 (1868) ; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. McGown, 65 Tex. 640 (1886).
In Pinnell v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 263 S. W. 182 (Mo. 1924), it was
held that stipulations on back of interstate free railway pass, relieving carrier
from liability for injury, were valid and complete defense to action for user's
death under Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906.
The carrier may contract with an insurer for indemnity for any loss sus-
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A telegraph company with its limited competition and its duty owed to
the public is in much the same situation as a common carrier in respect to con-
tracting against the consequences of the negligence of its employees. The same
reasons and objections are applicable. Their business intimately concerns the
public. The great majority of courts hold that any type of limitation on their
liability is invalid and against public policy.15 Some attempts by the telegraph
companies to limit their liability to the cost of the sending, in cases where the
message is not repeated, have been upheld,1 6 but other courts fear that the
dangers are too great to justify any encroachment upon the general rule.
Where a person contracts in the capacity of a bailee against the results
of a negligent discharge of that duty, there is much confusion as to the validity
of such an agreement.1 7 Most of the cases indicating the negative were utter-
Compress Co., 133 U. S. 387 (1890); Trenton Passenger Ry. v. Guarantors
Liability Indemnity Co., 60 N. J. L. 246, 37 Atl. 609 (1897). This would seem
to demonstrate that it is the objection of unequal position, or because there is a
duty owed the public, rather than the idea that the carrier will become careless.
The parties (shipper and carrier) may limit the extent of the carrier's
liability. Courts look upon this as an agreement for a liquidation of the damage.
"If this sum represents a reasonable attempt of the parties to fix a fair value
of the property in question, the agreement is in effect one for liquidating dam-
ages and is unquestionably valid." 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) § 1110, cit-
ing authorities.
The carrier, however, may contract for exoneration from liability for the
negligent performance of duties which he is not bound to make. Here he is not
contracting as a common carrier. Where he is contracting in another capacity, see
note 28, infra.
15. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chamblee, 122 Ala. 428, 25 So. 232 (1898);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Adams, 87 Ind. 598 (1882); Sweatland v. Ill. & M.
Tel. Co., 27 Iowa 433 (1869); Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 Mo. 661,
37 S. W. 904 (1896); Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301 (1881);
Thompson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 64 Wis. 531, 25 N. W. 789 (1885).
16. Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U. S. 1 (1894); Camp v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 1 Mete., 164 (Ky. 1858); Grinnell v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299 (1873); Birkett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 103 Mich.
361, 61 N. W. 645 (1894); Poor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 196 Mo. App. 557,
196 S. W. 28 (1917). The above courts reason that the sender is given notice
and if the message is important it should be repeated. They find nothing un-
reasonable in giving to sender the option of having it sent twice with the com-
pany being responsible, or only once with the sender himself taking the risk.
Considering the accidents to which the business is liable, these courts think this
provision is just and reasonable. It does not exempt the company from liability
but only fixes the price of that responsibility. The only question, really, is that
the price the sender has to pay to send the message with the liability attached is a
reasonable one, and if it is, the fact that parties are in unequal position is not
all controlling.
17. COoLEY, TORTS (Student's ed. 1930) 672 ("... the better reason sup-
ported by the weight of authority is that a bailee for hire may not exempt him-
self-from liability even for his ordinary negligence, or that of his servants or
agents"); 2 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) 1345 (this question "is a question up-
on which there is, apparently at least, a conflict of authority. . . . In cases in
which the question is actually involved, it seems to be held by the weight of
authority that such provision is valid. . . .") This note does not purport to
treat of the usual devices by which bailees have sought to limit their liabilities as,
for example, the posting of large sums, or provisions on receipts. In this prob-
lem see Note (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 772 (containing an excellent collection
of the authorities).
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ing mere obiter,'8 while the weight of authority of the square holdings are that
he can so relieve himself.19 With the situation thus, it is well to consider the
objections that have been previously advanced. Because of the public or semi-
public nature of many bailees, the argument is advanced that such a contract
is an attempt to relieve the bailee of duties imposed by law.20 But the only duty
the bailee owes the bailor, in the absence of special contract increasing the bail-
ee's liability, is to use ordinary care in the handling and keeping of the goods,2 1
the same duty that the entire doctrine of negligence is based upon. There is no
special duty, but only the same duty that everyone owes to everyone else in any
dealings with that person. Here the parties are not in such an unequal pos-
sition as they are in the case of the common carrier. It is likely that there are
situations where the bailee has a monopoly of storage facilities, but certainly
not to a large extent. A difference in the case of a shipper who must get goods
at a distant town within a short time and a bailor who must store his goods
in some place can be seen. Generally the bailor is in such a position that he can
negotiate a contract containing more favorable conditions than can a shipper.
Places of storage are more available than systems of railroads, especially in
smaller centers. While the necessity to store is likely to be as great as the neces-
sity to ship, the greater facilities for the former militates against the argu-
ment that the parties are not in equal position. It is more difficult to see how
this business is so essential to the commercial life of the nation as to prevent
the bailor for a valid consideration, usually a reduced storage fee, from agreeing
to run the risk of the bailee's servants exercising due care. The incentive to
maintain business good-will by the bailee is a factor which tends to guarantee
the safe storage of the goods. The courts are in harmony in holding that a
contract which would relieve the bailee of the consequences of his own fraud
or gross negligence (usually considered as amounting to fraud) is against pub-
lic policy,22 but, with all the considerations balanced, it seems that the bailor
should be permitted to assume the risk of ordinary negligence.2 3
18. Ex. parte Mobile Light and R. R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924);
Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602 (1922); Ges-
ford v. Star Van & Storage Co., 104 Neb. 453, 177 N. W. 794 (1920); Marlow
v. Conway Iron Works, 130 S. C. 256, 125 S. E. 569 (1924); Sporsem v. First
Nat. Bank, 133 Wash. 199, 233 Pac. 641 (1925).
19. World's Columbian Exposition Co. v. Republic of France, 96 Fed. 687
(C. C. A. 7th, 1899); Interstate Compress Co. v. Agnew, 255 Fed. 508 (C. C. A.
8th, 1919), 276 Fed. 882 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Fuqua, 150
Ark. 145, 233 S. W. 926 (1921); Gashweiler v. Wab., St. L. & Pac. Ry., 83 Mo.
112 (1884); Goslant v. Town of Calais, 96 Atl. 751 (Vt. 1916). Contra: Pilson
v. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Ore. 528, 136 Pac. 642 (1913); Downs v. Sley System
Garage, 194 Atl. 772 (Pa. Super. 1937).
20. Inland Compress Co. v. Simmons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (1916).
21. Mulvaney v. King Paint Mfg. Co., 256 Fed. 612 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
22. Cussen v. Southern Cal. Say. Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 65 Pac. 1099 (1901);
Smith v. Library Bd. of Minneapolis, 58 Minn. 108, 59 N. W. 979 (1894); Gash-
weiler v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry., 83 Mo. 112 (1884); Grady v. Schweinler,
16 N. D. 452, 113 N. W. 1031 (1907).
23. A contract limiting liability is not made by the delivery of a check
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Today, under existing economic conditions, with the supply of workers far
exceeding the demand, the courts have taken notice of the fact that the employ-
er and employee do not stand upon an equal footing when entering into a con-
tract of employment. 24 Where this objection is present, it follows that con-
tracts relieving the employer from the consequences of his negligent act, or
those for whose acts he is held responsible by law, are void.25 In Shohoney v.
Quincy, Omaha, & K. C. R. R.,26 Justice Lamm says that employers should not
be "at liberty to play upon the necessities and ignorance of their employees."
On this matter the states and Congress have passed legislation prohibiting the
contracts here involved. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act such an
exemption contract is rendered void.2 ' And the states under their Workman
Compensation Statutes have provided that such contracts are likewise unen-
forceable.
When the social considerations are not applicable, the result is different.
This is clearly shown when a carrier contracts against the consequences of his
negligent act, not as a carrier contracting with a passenger or shipper, but as
a lessor contracting with his tenant. Here, where there is no attempt to con-
tract against the consequences of a breach of a duty owed the public and the
parties are in equal position, the contract by the carrier as lessor is valid.28
of any proof that such provision was called to the attention of the owner of the
parcel and assented to by him: Brown v. Hines, 213 Mo. App. 298, 249 S. W.
683 (1923). Many times these stipulations are printed for the psychological
effect or protection in staving off suits. For a treatment of the problem as to
what will constitute a contract in these cases, see (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. REy.
772. The distinction between ordinary and gross negligence common to the bail-
ment cases, especially those concerning the liabilities of a gratutious bailee, has
been attempted to be drawn in cases involving contracts relieving from the con-
sequence of negligence. The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 574,
allows exemption from negligence "not falling greatly below the standard es-
tablished by law." In Ill. Central R. R. v. Morrison, 19 Ill. 135 (1857), the court
permitted a carrier to restrict its liability, but still remain liable for gross neg-
ligence or wilful misfeasance. This distinction was again recognized by the
same court in Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96, 24 N. E. 417 (1890).
However, the distinction, while easy to state, becomes difficult in its application
to facts. It may become difficult to draw the line between conduct that is below
the standard and that which is greatly below the standard required by law.
In Missouri, the distinction has been rejected as regards negligence generally,
and the reason behind the rejection would seem equally forceful in the situation
under discussion: ". . . there is no difference between negligence and gross
negligence, the latter being nothing more than the former, with the addition of
a vituperative epithet." McPheeters v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 45 Mo. 22(1869), quoted with approval in Reed v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 135
Mo. 661, 37 S. W. 904 (1896).
24. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
25. Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. Peterson, 39 Ill. App. 114 (1890); Palmer
v. Boston & M. R. R., 227 Mass. 493, 116 N. E. 899 (1917); Blanton v. Dold,
109 Mo. 64, 18 S. W. 1149 (1891); Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N. Y. 379, 77 N. E.
388 (1906); Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 52, 115 N. E.
505 (1916).
26. 223 Mo. 649, 122 S. W. 1025 (1909).
27. 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 55 (1928).
28. Cacey v. Virginian Ry., 85 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); Niederhaus
v. Jackson, 79 Ind. App. 551, 137 N. E. 623 (1922) ; Quirk Milling Co. v. Minnea-
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As between the lessor and the lessee, the court ordinarily has no concern as to
who shall assume the risk of negligence. Both are free to enter into the agree-
ment or refuse to do so. Public policy does not condemn the immunity clause
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. 29
Likewise, where persons are upon the land of another, it is not held to be
wrong for the owner to contract against the negligent acts of his servants.30
It would seem then, in future cases, after the contract is construed strictly
against the party relying thereon, and where the exempting clause is direct
and unambiguous, and the facts do not bring into operation either of the two
major objections (unequal position of the parties or contracting against the
consequences of a breach of duty of public service) for avoiding such contract,
this exemption clause should be upheld until time and experience give necessary
strength to the speculative argument that such exemption clause would foster
negligence.
CHiRLEs H. REHM
polis & St. L. R. R., 98 Minn. 22, 107 N. W. 742 (1906). Where some privilege
or concession is granted by a railroad company which it would not otherwise
be bound to extend, a contract exempting it from liability for the destruction
even of buildings not on its right of way is valid. See annotation (1927) 48
A. L. R. 1003.
29. Kirshenbaum v. Gen. Outdoor Adv. Co., 258 N. Y. 489, 180 N. E. 245
(1932), 84 A. L. R. 654 (1933).
30. Chesapeake Beach Ry. v. Hupp Automatic Mail Exch. Co., 48 App. D. C.
123 (1918); Checkley v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 257 Ill. 491, 100 N. E. 942 (1913);
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